ABSTRACT Due to the global increase in mobile devices and cellular networks such as 3G, 4G, or LTE-A networks, the concept of the interpenetration of peer-to-peer (P2P) overlay networks in cellular environments has gained immense popularity among mobile users. P2P networks allow users to share their computing resources efficiently with the advantages of fault tolerance, robust connectivity, load balancing, and easy maintenance. The ability of a peer to connect to another peer depends on the distinguishing features of the overlay networks. For connection, network routing tables are maintained by each peer in the network to construct the P2P overlay on the Internet. This construction renders the P2P networks vulnerable to the existing attacks using the Internet. Some of these attack models have been proposed in the past using botnets. However, models using botnets do not accommodate the advanced attacks that can infect the majority of the entries in the routing table. In this paper, we propose a model to analyze the impacts of routing table poisoning attacks on the P2P botnet (rBot) architecture. We present the security analysis of the proposed epidemic model for state-of-the-art rBots. The obtained results were effective for attacks on the unstructured P2P static and mobile environments.
I. INTRODUCTION
One among the basic uses of the Internet is the seamless shareability of data and applications among the peers connected in the network, which has paved ways for the development of applications to facilitate connectivity. The peer-topeer (P2P) overlay network has proven to be a popular choice got file-sharing applications. A critical requirement for file retrieval relies on the P2P overlay network to discover a peer that will help in establishing the connection.
With the growing demand for 3G, 4G or LTE-A cellular technologies, the importance of cost-effective P2P connection with less network traffic over cellular networks is realized [1] , [2] . However, due to the inherent network architecture and infrastructure, there exist significant vulnerabilities in P2P techniques exposing the network to various types of attacks to disrupt the communication.
Symantec, a leading anti-virus manufacturing organization has shown that a prominent attack on Internet can be performed using botnets [3] . To enhance the effect of botnets,
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the new generation of self-organizing botnets were organized under decentralized networks. This will enable them to spread their peers without having a single point of detection limitation or failure as in traditional Internet relay chat (IRC) based botnets. The distributed P2P botnets can communicate privately with other peer botnets under the disguise of normal traffic to update themselves.
Many botnet detection mechanisms have been proposed for different P2P overlays in the past, most of which are flow-based [4] - [7] , resource sharing [8] , peer-based input/output [9] , or conversation-based [10] to detect stealthy behavior by monitoring the P2P traffic in a network. Apart from these detection mechanisms, deep manual reports in conjunction with mathematical models have been used to analyze P2P botnets, as in [11] , [12] . The population properties of the P2P overlay have been analyzed broadly with the help of susceptible infectious recovered (SIR) [13] , susceptible infectious susceptible (SIS) [14] and susceptible infectious recovered susceptible (SIRS) epidemiological models [15] .
Every peer in a network maintains routing tables to construct the P2P overlay. This overlay facilitates efficient file sharing, video conferencing, live streaming and other possible applications. Hence, each entry in the peer table, within a P2P is crucial for the different applications in the network. The table entries are updated periodically as in MADPastry [16] . Further, it is assumed that only a few entries in the routing table will be infected when botnets are used for attacks, which can be rectified with computational efforts. However, more advanced attacks on the routing tables of P2P overlay networks are also possible.
In this paper, we present a routing table poisoning P2P botnet (rBot) model targeted towards a P2P network. A part of this work has been published in [17] which discussed a basic model for an entity based P2P botnets. This paper extends the results of [17] through rigorous analysis of the rBot in P2P overlay networks. Experiments were carried out under non-infectious and infectious environments. The impact of the proposed model is compared with the existing models. The major contributions of this paper include:
1) An effective routing 3) The analysis is performed in a non-infectious environment to define the stability of different P2P overlays. Further, the effect on stability with an increment of the rBot population within the overlay has been shown. 4) The proposed model was tested using empirical data, and the results were highly effective in detecting the states of the peers in the P2P network. Further, the model was successful in detecting the occurrence and nature of attacks on various P2P architectures. 5) We compared the proposed model with existing models [18] , [19] in the presence of rBots. We observed that the rBot malicious links are difficult to detect through the use of existing models. Memory monitoring of P2P smart-phones within the infectious and non-infectious environments are analyzed with the help of J2ME Wireless Toolkit. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section II we review the existing models for the P2P network and possible scope for improvements. The basic operation of the proposed rBot and its effect are presented in Section III. Subsequently, we model the proposed rBot epidemic behaviour in Section IV. In Section V and VI, we provide a comprehensive system analysis and detailed discussion on the performance of the proposed rBot model using empirical data. Finally, some concluding remarks along with future directions are presented in section VII.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
In general, a flow-based detection mechanism examines network communications between two peers to detect abnormal behavior of the network. Zhang et al. [6] implemented unsupervised machine learning to distinguish botnet traffic from genuine traffic flows with the help of statistical fingerprints, and the number of overlapping contacts, etc. This approach depends on the availability of multiple infected peers from the same botnet. Bapat et al. in [20] designed a statistical learning based model for anomaly detection. The proposed technique implements a logistic regression based model to identify the best features for botnet activity detection within the network. Barthakur et al. [5] claimed a novel approach to set small rules using Fuzzy logic for P2P botnet trafficking flow features. These features based on each flow is an aggregation of packet-level flow characteristics.
Machine learning based models identify the botnet flow features and detect a group of similar communication flow from the botnet. Alauthaman et al. in [21] proposed a method of P2P Bot detection that employs an adaptive multilayer feed-forward neural network with decision trees. Classification and regression techniques were used to select the relevant features in the system and create the network using a resilient back-propagation algorithm. self-adaptive (deep learningbased) anomaly (bot) detection system is proposed using the volume of network flows from 5G users' equipment [7] . A botnet interaction model was designed by Song et al. [18] using an efficient distributed evolutionary game model that exploits a random scanning infection method. The developed system has been shown to reach equilibrium when all the botnet owners take a cooperative strategy.
Rodríguez et al. in [8] proposed a mechanism that detects the botnet with the help of resource sharing information regarding each peer over a period. According to their intuition, the access behavior of the shared resources is different for legitimate peers and botnet peers. This mechanism could detect botnets using their potential patterns regarding resources. Yin et al. [9] analyzed the input/output flow from each peer. Their detection mechanism was based on the network characteristics of peers which are extracted over a period. PeerMinor [10] is an entirely behavioral system capable of detecting and classifying P2P botnets within corporate networks. It used the diagnosis results of ongoing malware infections and applied them to detect botnets in the network. So, it had a training phase for inspecting and classifying the botnets, which rendered the analysis report extensively.
Rossow et al. in [22] proposed a graph-based modeling model that captures the intrinsic properties and vulnerabilities of P2P botnets. Additionally, they have also shown some mitigation policies that are used in evaluating the resilience of the existing P2P botnets. Garg et al. [23] proposed a similar bot detection system to detect malicious peers in a network, which was based on failure traffic and communication traffic data. However, the practicality of the proposed algorithm is questionable as it is predominantly an off-line approach. PeerShark [24] aimed to detect botnets even when these botnets were not observable through the network administrator, which has not been realized in other previous works. It used a two-tier architecture with the collaboration of flow and conversation based approaches. It utilized a supervised machine learning model to distinguish between the botnet and genuine overlay peers.
Wang et al. [25] discussed the importance of the development of advanced hybrid botnet designing that captures not only the current requirements but also helps in better anticipation of future attacks. An improved hybrid model was designed by Yan et al. in [26] that combines the concepts of Maximum Connective Degree, and a self-adaptive routing algorithm that helped the P2P architecture reach a well-balanced overall connectivity. Ruitenbeek et al. in [27] demonstrated the impact of total propagation of the botnet with initial infection rate and the removal rate in the overlay. They employed a stochastic model formulation to examine various factors that impacted the growth of the botnet. The botnet attack at the time of bootstrapping in the P2P overlay with the help of Storm Worm botnet was demonstrated. The infected peers are declared as botnet after taking control from existing botnets or botmasters. Mean field mode was developed by Kolesnichenko et al. [28] to visualize a botnet attack on the P2P overlays. An infinite population of identical components could be computed for the same limiting behavior. They suggested that the peers formed an approximation of large identical components due to the botnet attack. The identical components were controlled centrally to ensure malfunctioning.
Yan et al. [11] presented a detailed mathematical analysis of P2P botnets and implemented an AntBot system in terms of reachability, scalability, and resilience to pollution. The solution was a tree-like structure to authenticate the incoming message. This could primarily be used to prevent and detect infections from a botnet attack. Wang et al. in [29] developed an intelligent system, named PeerGrep, to identify botnets in a P2P network. Their system starts with identifying potentially engaged hosts in P2P communications and distinguishes P2P bots from P2P hosts by analyzing their active ratio, packet size and the periodicity of connection to destination IP addresses.
In [12] , Feng et al. have analyzed the P2P botnets at both micro-level and macro-level, suggesting that the peers could be infected both directly and indirectly in the P2P network. The infection was shown to spread with the connection between infected P2P botnets (or computers).
Although many models have analyzed the effect of botnets over P2P networks, they have focused only on the infection of peers after establishing contact with the botnets and have not demonstrated an infectious entry of a botnet to be able to infect all other peers. Shujuan et al. [19] recently developed a mathematical model to study the propagation dynamics from infected neighbors. They analyzed the effect of malicious links on the basis of infected neighbors for different hop counts. Our proposed model considers the botnets as rBots that poison all entries of each overlay peer's routing table.
Developing and analyzing a rBot model to analyze their effect on different P2P overlays is detailed in this work.
III. rBOT AND ITS EFFECT
In this section, the basic operation of a rBot is presented, and its effect is analyzed through the PeerSim [30] simulator. The target of these rBot nodes is to pollute the routing table entries of genuine nodes. Thus, the infected node routes its messages (packets) to rBot nodes, which would be dropped later. This would reduce the performance or even disrupt the network in the worst case. To perform this, each rBot exploits the overlay routing/searching algorithm. In most overlay routing algorithms [31] , [32] , the routing table entries of the intermediate nodes are updated during routing/searching. As in GNUNet file-sharing [33] , each source rBot (rB 0 ) would execute search/route through a genuine (non-infected/partiallyinfected/fully-infected as in Figure 1 ) node (N j ) to another destination rBot node (rB 1 ). As a consequence, rBot replies to the neighborhood (N j ) directly forcing N j to update its routing table entry with rB 1 . This leads to an increase in the number of malicious/rBot entries in the routing table of N j . During the execution, each rBot node shares only its neighborhood node information.
FIGURE 1. Routing table entries infection.
A secret key (B k ) is shared among all the rBot nodes. B k can be hard-coded initially and updated periodically (δ time unit) to hide from static message analysis. To establish the secret key, each rBot maintains a private/public key pair (B Pr /B Pu ). Public key B Pu is in-built in the rBot executable command and thus, known to all rBots. Each rBot has its own private key B Pr . Using the secret key (B k ), the rBot members can share their neighborhood information in a confidential manner. Further, each rBot can securely execute their control commands such as 'start epidemic', 'update rBot information', 'drop message', etc. The control commands are stored as a data object in the overlay and searched by rBots as keys similar overlay look-up process. 'Start epidemic' control command instructs rBots to spread/place their Ids into the peer table entries of a genuine node.
To illustrate the effect of rBot activities after executing a 'drop message' (connection drop), we consider an unstructured P2P overlay with 1K peer members in PeerSim simulator. The graphical representation of the simulated results was obtained using Mathematica tool, where dots (or rectangles) represent peers, while the connections among peers are VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 2. A healthy P2P overlay. represented by lines. Figure 2 shows a healthy P2P overlay based on gossip-based protocol with no rBots. It can be visualized that after a few simulation cycles, the overlay is well connected to serve the peers. The overlay forms a hub topology after joining 20 rBots as shown in Figure 3 . As shown in Figure 3 majority of genuine peers are controlled by rBots. Due to this, the entire overlay would be disturbed. We present a rBot model to analyze the reproduction rate of rBots and their effects on different P2P networks in the next section.
IV. MODELLING OF rBOT
In this section, we propose and describe a mathematical model of a routing table poisoning P2P botnet (rBot) model. In this model, we classify the peers under different classes and sub-classes in their lifetimes during a P2P network epidemic. In such networks, non-infected peers would be infected through infectious links. Also, infected peers will increase the chance of the routing table infection. These infectious links are noticed as a homogeneous population among the entire population at any intermediate time t. The one-hop peer table entries determine the community of each class and the overall population is distributed into four categories as in Figure 4 .
1 Possible Infectious Class (P)-This category comprises of the peers that are vulnerable to attacks. These peers or its neighbor table entries (one hop table) , as in the Figure 4 . Therefore, all peers in this class are said to be in a rBot free environment. During an epidemic, these class members help to recover from rBots. We consider a fraction of this population, say b 1 , to be responsible for recovery.
The members of classes P and R check for the state of infection among their single hop members to update their corresponding categories while the members of the sub-class I 0 and I 1 can only check their member table entries to redefine their class categories. We consider these sub-classes to be a stand-alone class throughout our analysis of the model. The members of class Q can change their category based on two conditions. First, the member must replace all rBot entries and second, it has to wait for the predefined threshold time. The model allocates various transmission rates to the different classes according to the population behavior, as shown in Figure 5 . The notations used in this work along with their description are summarized in Table 1 . 
A. DYNAMICS OF CLASS (P) POPULATION
Each member peer in class P may be re-categorized into the removal class R, as a partially infected class, I 0 or fully infected I 1 class. redA peer is moved to I 0 sub-class when its routing table is updated with a rBot link entry. However, it is moved to I 1 in the case where all its entries get updated with rBot links. Let the transmission rate from class (P) to I 0 be α 1 and that from class P to I 1 be α 2 . A peer leaves class P and moves to class R in the case of recovery from all its rBot entries with the help of the neighbor table entries. The rate of this movement is defined as β 4 .
B. DYNAMICS OF CLASS (I) POPULATION
The members of this population are responsible for spreading the rBot links and can be distinguished into two sub-classes.
Peers of sub-class I 0 contain fewer rBot links in their routing table. The rBot links may be updated with good connections. In that case, the recovered peers are shifted to class P at a transmission rate of β 1 . A peer moves from I 0 to I 1 sub-class whenever the routing table of the peer has all its entries updated with rBot links. Let the transmission rate of this movement be α 3 . This movement might also be due to rBots that generate partially infected routing tables and more rBot links to pollute all its routing entries. In that case, the peer moves into the fully infected I 1 sub-class with a transmission rate of α 3 .
C. DYNAMICS OF CLASS (Q) POPULATION
The peers in quarantine class (Q) are treated as rBots. These peers are assumed to be isolated from others to prevent the growth of rBots. Therefore, other peers cannot accept any of their messages. These peers can move to class P with β 5 transmission rate after being released from class Q under certain conditions.
D. DYNAMICS OF CLASS (R) POPULATION
The peers of this have their routing tables, as well as their nearest peer's routing table completely free from rBot entries. The model treats this class as healthy peers and free from infection. These peers are allowed to communicate with other peers in the overlay. The number of peers in this class may be reduced depending on whether the nearest peer routing table entries get infected forcing them to move into class P. This increases the population of class P with a transmission rate of α 5 .
We can analyze the dynamics of each class at any given time t using the following differential equations:
where, µ is churn rate (i.e., peer joining and leaving a class/sub-class) to make the equation more realistic for any network size, say N, where
The probability of infection per routing table entry is ρ 1 .
Since the infection propagates through class I 0 and I 1 sub-classes of the infectious class, the infection rate of the model is:
where, (a 0 << a 1 ) and (a 0 + a 1 = 1).
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Each rBot entry is updated with healthy links using a probability, say ρ 2 ,. The probability depends on b 1 , b 2 , and b 3 , which are fractions of the populations classes R, P and I 0 respectively. Therefore, the recovery rate of an infectious class is given by First, we define the effort of a rBot to infect a good entry of a routing table for a particular peer through f (k). p 1 is the probability of rBot entry or replacement of a good peer in one out of k number of entries in a routing table. The probability that after i th attempts it obtains k successes (i.e., entering rBots) is (p i 1 (1−p 1 ) i−k ). Therefore, the total expected number of attempts to infect for each of the entries in the routing table can be expressed as:
Next, we define the effort of good peers to recover from rBot entries in routing tables through a function g(k). p 2 is the probability of replacing the rBot entry with a good peer in the routing table. The probability after i th attempts by which it generates k successes (i.e., entering good peers) is (p k 2 (1 − p 2 ) i−k ). Hence, the total expected number of effort required for entry recovery is:
The transmission rate of a class is:
where x, y ∈ (1 to 5). To define each function with different transmission rates, we consider two random variables X and Y which correspond to some infections from rBots and recovery from good peers. These variables take values according to their associated member class. For example, f 1 (k) is the infectious function of k with Prob(X k-1) for the class member P to move into class I 0 . Similarly, the recovery function g 1 (k) has Prob(Y = k−1) for moving from the class I 0 to class P.
V. rBOT ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the stability of the rBot model by computing the equilibrium points that can be derived using the following equations:
We consider the overlay to be churn free (i.e., no peer leaving or joining) ) and consider two environments: 1) noninfectious and 2) infectious. Since members of class P are infected links in the routing table of their neighbors, all peers must be stored inside the recovery class (R) in a non-infectious environment. Thus, the feasible population of Eqn. 13 is (0, 0, 0, 0, N) for (P, I 0 , I 1 , Q, R) classes respectively.
For the infectious environment, we consider a fraction of population (rN ) are malicious (rBot), which are a member of class Q. Remaining ((1 − r)N ) fraction of the population are good and represented by class R. These two assumptions make the environment stable until the transmission starts from class Q. We formulate the reproduction rate for these rBots. Thus, the feasible population of Eqn. 13 is (0, 0, 0, rN, (1-r)N) for (P, I 0 , I 1 , Q, R) classes.
A. STABILITY ANALYSIS OF NON-INFECTIOUS ENVIRONMENT
We approximate the non-linear system of coupled differential Eqns. (1−5) to a first order liner differential equations at point (0, 0, 0, 0, N). Therefore, using multidimensional Taylor series approximation:
where, n 0 = (0, 0, 0, 0, N ) and Jacobi matrix J (Eqn. 15), as shown at the top of the next page, at point (n 0 ) is defined by the matrix. The corresponding eigenvalues of J are:
Since, all parameters of the model have positive real values,
We define the reproduction rate to be
R 0 in Eqn. 17 depends on the infection rate (function) and recovery rate (function), which are a 0 , b 1 , f 5 (k) and g 3 (k). Clearly, equilibrium is locally asymptotic stable when R 0 < 1.
B. STABILITY ANALYSIS OF INFECTIOUS ENVIRONMENT
We take a first order liner approximation of the non-linear system of coupled differential equations 1 to 5 at point
(0, 0, 0, rN, (1-r)N). By using multidimensional Taylor series approximation, we get
where, n 0 = (0, 0, 0, rN , (1 − r)N ) and Jacobi matrix J' (Eqn. 19) at point (n 0 ) is defined by the matrix. In this matrix, we eliminate E 2 and E 4 due to the assumption of stable environment of rBots. The corresponding eigenvalues of J are:
Since, all parameters of the model have positive real values, we have L 3 < 0. We define the reproduction rate as shown below.
and
where
. Clearly, equilibrium is locally asymptotic stable when R 0 < 1 or R 0 < 1.
VI. RESULT ANALYSIS
The proposed P2P rBot model has been implemented and its performance evaluation is carried out using MATLAB R2016a on a PC with Intel Core i5 processor with 8GB of main memory.
We analyze the reproduction rate R 0 in Eqn. 17, keeping parameters p 1 , p 2 , and k fixed at 0.5, 0.5 and 3 respectively, while varying the values of a 0 and b 1 , results of which are shown in Figure 6 . Both the parameters, a 0 and b 1 , are allowed to pick values within the interval [0,1]. In Figure 6 , the dotted line indicates the effect on reproduction rate with different values of a 0 along with a constant value for b 1 . Similarly, the solid line shows the effect of reproduction rate with a constant value of a 0 and varying values of b 1 . The above experimentation depicts the fact that lesser the fractional value of a 0 , higher the chance to spread the epidemic as the fraction value of fully infected class I 1 (i.e., a 1 ) is more since (a 0 + a 1 ) = 1. The epidemic will end when the chosen (fraction) constant b 1 is attained. It can also be noted that the fractional value of b 1 restricts the epidemic until the point where it becomes equal to the chosen constant (fractional value) a 0 . Next, we analyze the probability values of infection and recovery rates, the results of which are shown in Figure 7 . In this experiment, we visualize the effect of various probabilistic values while keeping a 0 and b 1 fixed at 0.5. The dotted line in Figure 7 depicts the behavior of the infection probability (p 1 ) while the recovery probability (p 2 ) is fixed at different values. Consequently, the solid line in Figure 7 shows the behavior of p 2 for different values of p 1 . From Figure 7 , it can be observed that the epidemic will begin whenever p 1 > 0.5 irrespective of p 2 values, which indicates that the network will not allow the infection probability to surpass the recovery probability to preserve the network topology.
A. EFFECT OF RBOT ON DIFFERENT P2P OVERLAYS IN NON-INFECTIOUS ENVIRONMENT
The reproduction rate is varying due to a variety of overlay communication mechanisms and the nature of attacks. We analyze the rBot effects on mobile and wired P2P overlays. Here, it is assumed that a rBot can infect table entries of a peer according to its P2P architectures. The effect of infection, recovery and reproduction rates depend on the overlay table update mechanism.
1) STRUCTURED P2P
The structured overlay maintains a routing table entry in a well-defined topology, such as a ring in Chord [31] , hyper-cubic in CAN [32] , etc. The topology may be connected to a pattern, such as the closest distance between two peers. Generally, most of them maintain up to m entries in their routing table.
Let, the random variable X give the number of all possible entries in the neighboring routing tables. So, X can take values within the range of 0 to m. From equation 9, the expected number of efforts to infect table entries of structured peers will be:
On a contrary, recovery function g s (m) denotes the effort to recover m entries from rBot links in a routing table. In this case, the random variable Y gives the number of routing table entries (i.e., m). Hence, the expected effort to recover these rBot entries in a structured overlay is expressed as below. The reproduction rate of the equation 17 can be redefined as R s 0 :
2) UNSTRUCTURED P2P
An unstructured overlay is connected through a random peer sampling mechanism gossip protocol. This gossip protocol shares a set of its current neighbors, called the view of a peer, to its neighbors. The length of the set (gossip-length) is maintained in accordance with the gossip mechanism such as Newscast [34] , Cyclon [35] . Therefore, a single communication between peers may be able to place multiple table entries up to the gossip-length (say m) at a time. Therefore, the expected effort to infect table entries (i.e., m 2 ) of an unstructured peer is given by:
In this overlay, recovery function g u (m) denote the effort to recover m 2 entries of a routing table from the rBot links. Hence, the expected effort to recover from these rBot entries in an unstructured P2P overlay is given by:
The reproduction rate of Eqn. 17 can be redefined as R u 0 :
The rBot entries can be injected into the cellular mobile P2P networks (such as MobiStore [1] , V-Chord [2] ). MobiStore divides the participating cellular or Internet peers into virtual peers (VPs). The members of a VP are connected to each other and update their connection links with the help of the gossip-based protocol periodically. Alternatively, all VPs are connected and maintained as a Chord-based DHT mechanism [31] to share their finger (or routing) [1] . Here, v is the total number of local peers and c is a constant. Therefore, the expected effort to infect the table entries of cellular mobile peers is given by:
In this overlay scenario, the expected effort to recover from these rBot entries in cellular mobile P2P overlay can be expressed as:
The reproduction rate of the equation 17 can be redefined as R lte 0 :
The figure 8 shows the infection effort of rBots to pollute table entries in structured P2P is more difficult in comparison to unstructured and mobile P2P overlay network environments. Also, it is more reliable to recover in comparison to others. Cellular mobile P2P performs worse in recovery; however, its reproduction rate is quite high as shown in the figure 8.
B. rBOT EFFECTS ON P2P OVERLAY FOR INFECTIOUS ENVIRONMENT
We consider a r fraction of peers as rBots out of the entire population of an overlay, and it stays in class Q while remaining (1 − r) are in class R. To analyze the effect of class Q, three transmission rates are considered from Q to R as 1x, 5x, and 10x. Here, x indicates the duration for which the transmission is paused in class Q to restrict the rBot communication with good peers. We simulated the effect of a fraction of rBots existence in an overlay from 0.1 to 0.9. To calculate R 0 and R 0 , We consider the value of b 1 and b 2 are 0.5 and 0.3 respectively. Figure 9 (a) shows the behavior of reproduction rate R 0 is more defensive and maintains overlay in a stable condition as compared to R 0 (Figure 9(b) ) with the involvement of more rBots. Therefore, R 0 is suitable for less recoverable overlays from a rBot attack such as LTE/5G. R 0 with a uniform transmission rate prevents the overlay approximately 40% of existing rBots. After introducing the delay in transmission from class Q, it prevents up to 90% of existing rBots. It fails following the instability of the overlay from rBots in transmission delay mechanism due to false positives inside the class Q.
In recoverable overlays, such as structured P2P, R 0 is more suitable to prevent rBot attacks. As shown in Figure 9 (b), it maintains less false positives after introducing the transmission delay mechanism. Hence, we see that it prevents the overlay up to 40% of rBots existence with the 10x transmission. Therefore, it is a trade-off among both reproduction rates regarding transmission delay, false positives, and recoverable table entries.
C. COMPARISON OF THE PROPOSED MODEL
We compare the reproduction rate of the proposed epidemic model with those in [18] , [19] . Song et al. in [18] determine the botnet reproduction rate (R [18] 0 ) through α [18] (an average recovery factor), µ [18] (an average infectious factor), and pair-wise botnet contact rates (λ [18] 1 and λ [18] 2 ), which is defined as follows: [18] µ [18] )λ [ 
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+ (1 − α [18] µ [18] )λ [18] 2 (32) where, superscript represents the variable in the referenced existing model. In this, equilibrium is locally asymptotic stable when R [18] [19] analyze the network heterogeneity, and an epidemic of worm propagation among d number of hop counts. In this, each peer had up to k neighbor entries on average in its routing table and considered its mean degree as < k >. They defined the reproduction rate R [19] 0 as: [19] γ [19] < k 2 > < k > + H [19] (33)
where, β [19] , γ [19] , and < k 2 > are defined in [19] as transmission rate, recovery rate, and second order moment respectively. H [19] is defined as (
where p(1)/ < k > means the probability of having k second neighbors of a peer. Here, equilibrium is locally asymptotic stable when R [19] 0 < 1. For analysis, we consider value of the average infection rate, recovery rate, and β [19] as 0.5, where as γ [19] = 0.3 for model [19] . Similar considerations are considered for existing work [18] as α [18] = β [18] = 0.5 and Pair-wise botnet contact rates 0.5 (λ [18] 1 ) and 0.3 (λ [18] 2 ). Figure 10 compares the reproduction rate for different epidemic models under infectious environment without the account of immunization. The proposed model (using either R 0 or R 0 ) confirms that the rBots infect routing table entries epidemically as shown in the simulated results of section III, whereas, the existing schemes cannot identify the epidemic behavior of rBots. Thus, the comparison confirms that the routing table poisoning attack (rBot) is difficult to analyze through the use of existing epidemic models. The existing models show the global stability of the equilibrium, although, the overlay is in-equilibrium. Our proposed rBot model provides the closest actual equilibrium due to the inclusion of all table entries along with their respective neighbor's entry. This provides a clear distinction to existing epidemic model approaches.
After analyzing the effect of rBot on overlay connectivity as the number of malicious entries in the routing table, we perform an emulation in the next section to show the effect of memory consumption in the presence of rBots. 
D. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS ON SIMULATED DATA
We developed a Sample Test MIDlet over V-Chord [2] overlay with the help of Java2 Micro Edition (J2ME) Wireless Toolkit 2.5.2. The emulation setup used MIDlet-2.1 and CLDC-1.1 with Bluetooth/OBEX preferences as maximum packet length (= 4096 bytes), discovery time out (= 10K seconds), receive MTU (512 bytes), etc. In this performance test, we consider a mobile station 1 (MS1) which fetches 50 shared files within the overlay. Due to V-Chord overlay, each MS forwards the search request to a pilot. The pilot forwards the request to associate pilot members, eNodeB, or insights its own meta-data to response the query. In this sample test, the communication over MSs and pilots are performed through Bluetooth to analyze the effect of memory overhead in the presence of rBots. Each result shows the memory consumption growth and maximum memory capacity of an MS (or pilot) through x-axis and y-axis respectively. Figure 11 shows the memory monitor in a non-infectious overlay environment, where files are searched without refreshment of heap memory (2MB). It shows that the peers consume a small portion of memory while retrieving their shared files. To analyze the effect of malicious peers, we emulate the overlay file sharing activity in the presence of rBots. These rBot peers communicate and retrieve their files intentionally to consume the memory of Pilot1 (Figure 11(a) ) and MS1 (Figure 11(b) ). The memories of MS and pilots are continuously forced to refresh with the presence of only 0.1 fractions of rBots (= 5), which can be analyzed as shown in Figure 12 . The figure reflects the extra overload on Pilot1 (Figure 12(a) ) and MS1 (Figure 12(b) ) due to the presence of rBots within its associated MSs.
We emulate the model with transmission delay in quarantine class members to show the resistance from memory flush out for both pilot and MS having 10MB heap size. The figure 13(a) shows single flush out in presence of 5 transmission delay (5x) at quarantine class. After delaying 10x (Figure 13(b) ), the memory overhead problem is eliminated. On the other head, the 10x delay is not suitable for pilots due to heavy file retrieving traffic as shown in Figure 14 (a). Figure 14(b) shows the overhead problem can be eliminated at 30x. Figure 15 shows data flush count at heap memory of MSs with various shared data size capacities within a varying fractions of rBots availability in the overlay. More data sharing capacities provide opportunities to rBots to overload malign data to good MSs. The mitigation from this case is possible either by introducing a delay in transmission of quarantine class member or by reducing their data sharing capacities.
VII. CONCLUSION
Botnet attacks are well-known for their capability to pollute and infect a wide range of networks. In this work, we propose a decentralized P2P botnet, namely rBot, and report on its effects, such as high memory overhead and weakening of overlay connectivity, by various simulations. We present a mathematical model to analyze the stability of the network. The model is simulated in a cellular network as well as structured and unstructured overlays. Further, a detailed analysis was carried out in comparison to some of the state-of-the-art models, which shows that the proposed model performs better in detecting rBot malicious links.
With the capability to handle centralized or distributed botmasters, botnets can also integrate multiple types of networks, such as mobile networks or static networks to spread its infection. As a part of future research direction, we intend to work on in-depth performance analysis of the general solutions using our proposed rBot model. We also intend to perform an extensive analysis of the proposed model with newer routing attacks within static and churn overlay. An intelligent mitigation technique capable of withstanding advanced routing table poisoning attacks in a P2P network can also be modeled and studied.
